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Abstract 
I look critically at accounts of human action which help themselves to a certain conception of the causal 
order when they treat actions as effects of mental states. Donald Davidson introduced such accounts in 
the shape of the “belief-desire theory.” By way of examining Davidson’s ideas about events, I undertake 
to show what conceptions of time and of causality are needed for understanding agency, and for a viable 
naturalism. 
I 
I’m going to be concerned with the idea of an event and the conception of the passage of time 
as these are found in the causal theory of action. The theory continues to hold considerable 
sway: it is widely endorsed by philosophers of mind, and often taken for granted by 
philosophers answering questions in meta-ethics or questions about freedom. The theory has 
certainly met opposition in the philosophy of action. But its opponents for the most part have 
wanted to present an alternative to it rather than address the thinking that lies behind it.  
Naturalism is one source of the causal theory—a naturalism according to which an account 
of any phenomenon caught up with causality must present the phenomenon as fitted to “the 
event causal order.” This being a Romanell lecture, its topic is “philosophical naturalism.” If the 
failings of the causal theory of action that I hope to articulate count against the naturalism 
which hosts it, then unless the event causal theory is to be rejected in favour of some sort of 
anti-naturalism, there must be a question what a defensible naturalism might consist in. I won’t 
address that question until I’ve said something about the origins of the causal theory of action 
and explained why, as it seems to me, it fails to introduce a conception of time needed for a 
proper understanding of human agency, or indeed of any agency.  
Evidently I take naturalism to come in different versions. So too does “the” causal theory of 
action as I mean this. Common to all versions is the claim that when there is human action, 
mental states meeting certain specifications cause a movement of the body of the person 
whose mental states they are. Donald Davidson got the theory started: he argued for what has 
come to be known as “the desire-belief account” in his seminal 1963 paper “Actions Reasons 
and Causes.” Later Davidson moved to a version of in which a desire and a belief jointly cause an 
intention. And Michael Bratman has developed a theory of intention which brings a definite 
conceptual addition to Davidson’s account of it. Still, Bratman takes his theory to belong in “the 
tradition of philosophical concern with the metaphysics of human agency and its place in the 
natural causal order.” The tradition lives on: many of those whose view of intention is quite 
different from Bratman’s apparently share the metaphysical assumptions of the causal theory. 
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These assumptions that will be at issue here: I want to put in question whether agency should 
be located in the natural causal order when that is conceived as an event causal order. 
It was by treating actions as events that Davidson found a place for agency in the event 
causal order (§II). And unlike those who’ve followed in his footsteps in philosophy of action, 
Davidson paid attention metaphysical assumptions on which his ontology of events was rested. 
I’m going to subject Davidson’s idea of events to scrutiny (§§III and IV). I hope that examining 
what may be meant by “event” can reveal what conceptions of time and of causality are needed 
in a treatment of agency and in a viable naturalism (§V). 
II 
The content of naturalism being in question, it may be instructive to start with the historical 
antecedents of the event causal theory of action. One place to look is a debate that took place 
when psychology was a young science, recently separated from philosophy. Broadly speaking, 
psychologists were then divided into two schools, between those who favoured teleological 
explanation and those who favoured exclusively mechanistic explanation, the latter being said 
to “make use of the language of the physical sciences.” When the psychologist E.R. Guthrie 
spoke of the opposition between these two schools, he wrote in the Journal of Philosophy in 
1924. Philosophers responded to him. One such philosopher was C.J. Ducasse. And Davidson 
read Ducasse.1 
Ducasse thought that Guthrie’s distinction between mechanism and teleology was “much 
too loose.” He wanted “to define … explanation, purpose, and purposiveness with precision.” 
He defined explanation as consisting in “the offering of a hypothesis or fact, standing to the fact 
to be explained as a case of antecedent to a case of consequent of some already known law of 
connections” (1925, 150–1). Ducasse assumed that backwards causation is ruled out, so that 
when he addressed the question whether explanation could be purposive, he asked how it 
could be that “a fact that has not yet occurred could explain—i.e. be a possible cause of—a fact 
that has already occurred.” His answer was that it could do so “only if an intelligence aware of 
the contingency of the second upon the first, and desiring the occurrence of the second, is 
thereby moved to bring about the first.” But, then, he argued, that in “the only sort of 
explanation of X in which the dependence of Y on X enters, it enters not as something true, but 
only as something believed” (1925, 152). So, said Ducasse, if there is a genuine case of 
purposiveness, then: 
It is essential that the following elements be present, or be supposed, by the speaker, 
to be present: 
Belief by the performer of the act in a law … e.g. that If X occurs, Y occurs. 
Desire by the performer that Y shall occur 
Causation by that desire and that belief jointly, of the performance of X. 1925, 153. 
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Davidson’s agenda were not Ducasse’s; and there are plenty of differences between their 
two accounts. Davidson was principally concerned to argue that the cause of an action is found 
in the explanans of an explanation of it which is given in stating the agent’s reason, whereas 
Ducasse simply wanted to show that explanation could be purposive. Davidson spoke of agents 
as possessing what have come to be known as means-end beliefs, whereas Ducasse credited 
agents with beliefs in laws. It is obscure what the instances of the “X”s and “Y”s in Ducasse’s 
believed-in-laws might be supposed to be. But Davidson took a clear view of what caused what 
when an action was explained. He said that “it serves [his] argument … that the desired end 
explains the action only if what are believed by the agent to be means are desired” (1963, 689). 
And he said that a belief which combines with a want to yield an action is “a belief that the 
action described in a certain way has a certain property” (see (C1) at 687).2 
Davidson illustrated his view with an explanation of a case in which he (Davidson himself) 
had turned on the light. In that case what he wanted was to turn on the light; and the 
description of his turning on of the light under which a reason was found was “a switch 
flipping.” So here, on his account, his belief would be that the action described as a switch 
flipping has the property of being a turning on of the light. There is a problem with this, 
however. Davidson said “the existence of the event of my turning on the light is required by the 
truth of “I turned on the light” (687); and it is the truth of his belief which accounts for his 
having been successful in turning on the light. (Unless his belief had been true, there could be 
no explanation of his having turned on the light.) But no event having the property of being a 
turning on of the light exists until the light has been turned on. So it seems that the event which 
is his action must antedate the belief—the belief which, along with a pro-attitude, was the 
reason for his action and its cause. Davidson needed to think of the effect as existing ahead of 
its cause. This is just what Ducasse in his own way strove to avoid. Ducasse’s method of 
avoidance, however, unlike Davidson, was not to introduce any events which agents’ beliefs 
might be about, but to introduce beliefs in laws.  
In Davidson’s defence, it might be said that the belief playing the role of cause need not be 
taken to concern the very (singular) action which existed only once he had turned on the light. 
Indeed Davidson later said “When I wrote [1963], it had not yet occurred to me that a sentence 
like ‘Eve ate the apple’ should not be taken to contain a singular reference to an event” (2001, 
xiv). Thus Davidson might as well have said that an event having the property of being a turning-
on-of-a-light was required for the truth of “I turned on the light”, and need not have spoken of 
the event. But this is no solution to the problem. Davidson’s belief must still be supposed to 
require the existence of something having the property “being a turning on of the light.” And 
what makes for the problem is that the description of the effect makes use of the past-tense—
“turned on”—where that of the putative cause requires the existence of something which 
present tensely “has” a certain property. 
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Davidson always reported actions using the simple past tense.3 But Davidson used the 
present tense when illustrating his views about the causes of actions. Thus, for instance, “We 
desire it to be true that we learn the meaning of the word ‘amygdala’; we believe that we will 
find out what ‘amygdala’ means by looking in the O.E.D.; we may be prompted to take the 
appropriate volume of the O.E.D down from the shelf” (2000, 53; my italics). In other of 
Davidson’s examples, an agent who has reason enough do something intends to do it, or is 
committed to doing it, or concludes that she would do well to do it. But as the examples are 
presented, never does the agent do the thing in question.4 Of course Davidson’s reader is likely 
to imagine that the agent will carry on so as actually to do that which she may be prompted to, 
or intends to, or is committed to doing. Certainly Davidson never excludes such a possibility. 
Still, as the examples are described, an agent’s desire and belief fall short of actually producing 
an action: a reader has to adopt two different temporal perspectives in order to put the 
occurrence of an action together with its causal origins. The existence of an action is a matter of 
the agent’s actual deed, already done, but an action’s occurrence is explained in terms of 
merely possible futures. Yet the explanation was supposed to discover a cause of the action. 
III 
I’ve taken aim against the event causal theory of action which Davidson got started. But I want 
now to take Davidson’s side on one ontological question. Davidson defended a certain ontology 
of events in his paper “Events as Particulars.” There he wrote:  
[W]e are committed to an ontology of unrepeatable particulars, (“concrete individuals”). 
It is to such events that we refer, or purport to refer, when we use descriptions like “the 
death of Monteverdi”, “his second interview after the trial”, … . It is events of this kind 
one of which is said to be self-identical in “His first attempt on the North Face was his 
last.” 1970, 25. 
Davidson had given an argument for an ontology of events in an earlier paper, “The Logical 
Form of Action Sentences”, which was concerned specifically the events that are actions. By an 
“action sentence”, Davidson meant one containing an action verb in the simple past tense. (He 
didn’t define an “action verb.” Suffice here to say that he treated verbs in the category known 
as accomplishment verbs.) I shall come to the argument in due course. For now I want to look at 
Davidson’s proposal about logical form as he illustrated it for a particular case.  
Here is what he said: 
On my proposal, “Meyer climbed Kibo” is analysed as saying that  
[A] there exists an event that is a climbing of Kibo by Meyer:  
in symbols, “(∃x) (Climbed (Kibo, Meyer, x).” 1970, 28. 
In order to consider the proposal, I have provided the sentence Davidson takes to be delivered 
by analysis with a name: I’ve called it [A]. Between [A] and his official, symbolic version, 
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Davidson had a colon. But it is difficult to see how the two of them could really be equivalent. 
The symbolic version makes use of a 3-place predicate finishing with the past tense morpheme 
“ed”. It then seems that [A], if equivalent, must, despite its being present tense on the face of it, 
somehow be understood to speak of the past. One can experiment with amending [A] to have it 
speak of the past. One could put “exists” or “is” into the past-tense, trying either “There exists 
an event that was a climbing” or “There existed an event that is a climbing.” But neither 
amendment will make things come out right. “There exists an event that was a climbing” 
apparently introduces a changeable thing, which an event presumably is not. As for “There 
existed an event that is a climbing”, this might provoke the question whether that event still 
exists. But an event which exists in virtue of someone’s having done something, is hardly going 
to go out of existence.  
Davidson has to have thought that any event said by [A] to exist is something that actually 
exists only when Meyer has already climbed Kibo. This certainly tallies with his remarks about 
events. “Concrete individual” appears to have no application to something which doesn’t yet 
exist or which might cease to exist. And Davidson made a point of saying that events are things 
terms for which can flank the identity sign, so that if one of them could be referred to, it could 
be referred to again. Thus the concrete particulars, to whose existence Davidson claimed our 
commitment in saying that we are committed to an ontology of events, are things over and 
done with—are inherently past, so to speak. 
Davidson’s symbolic version of “Meyer climbed Kibo” provides the word “climbed” with a 
role it can play in other English sentences, but it gives no role to the word “climb”. Insofar as he 
failed to treat “climbed” as composed from “climb” + a past tense morpheme, Davidson could 
seem to have flouted his own principle of compositionality in semantics.5 But however that may 
be, it is a question how “climbed”, along with other transitive action verbs in the past tense, are 
to be understood as expressing 3-place relations. “Climbed” is 2-place on the face of it: when x 
has climbed y, x and y stand in the relation in which any pair of things stand if the first climbed 
the second. This two-place relation can be grasped by anyone who can use the word “climb”. 
But we have no clue how to manufacture it out of Davidson’s 3-place “Climbed”. Indeed it 
seems that we really have no idea what relations might be expressed by such predicates as 
“Climbed(x ,y ,e ) .” Of course these predicates, with their extra places, would be understood if it 
were stipulated that they occur only in such quantified sentences as “(∃x)(—– -ed (a, b, e)” and 
stipulated also that such a sentence simply means that a —— -ed b. But why make such 
stipulations? Why think that “Meyer climbed Kibo” and the like must be taken to say that an 
event of a certain sort exists?6 
There is no need to make these stipulations in order to defend the ontology of events that 
Davidson said we are committed to. One can support the idea that such events as Meyer’s 
climbing of Kibo exist by reference to the fact that a nominal such as “Meyer’s climbing of Kibo” 
can denote something which Davidson would call a “concrete individual” but only actually does 
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denote something when the corresponding past-tense sentence is true. Thus so long as, but 
only so long as, it is alright to take it for granted that a φ-d, “a’s φ-ing” denotes an event. We 
saw that Davidson at one time thought that an action sentence contains a singular reference to 
an event, and only later came to think that it says that at least one event of a certain sort exists. 
Well, in any ordinary use, a sentence on the pattern of “a φ-d” is surely not understood as 
equivalent to “a φ-d at least once.” Somehow or other, a reference to a time is ordinarily 
implicit in an actual use of “a φ-d”. This ensures that “a’s φ-ing” is, often enough, taken to have 
a definite denotation. And it means that even if the sentence “a φ-d” contains neither 
quantification over events nor any reference to an event, still the truth the sentence, as it would 
ordinarily be used, can suffice for the existence of an event.7 
If this is right, then Davidson’s claim about events’ existence can make a claim in 
metaphysics which is not reliant on his claim about the linguistic structure of his action 
sentences. Davidson spoke of events when he wrote in metaphysical vein. He said: 
[O]bject and event differ. One is an object which remains the same object through 
changes, the other a change in an object or objects. Spatiotemporal areas do not 
distinguish them, but our predicates, our basic grammar, our ways of sorting do. Given 
my interest in the metaphysics implicit in our language, this is a distinction I do not 
want to give up. 1985, 176. 
An object here, which remains the same object through changes, is an enduring thing, a 
continuant.8 With such objects in the picture, an event belonging to the ontology to which 
Davidson claimed our commitment will depend for its existence upon time’s having passed—
time during which one or more objects have changed.9 
The existence of an object requires that it should have come into existence. And the answer 
to a question about how a concrete particular came to exist will need to advert to a past more 
distant than that at which it first existed.10 Meyer was brought into existence by conception, 
and Kibo by the movements of tectonic plates. As for the climb of Kibo by Meyer, that particular 
came to exist when “Meyer climbed Kibo” was first true—when Meyer reached the summit of 
Kibo presumably. Before that, the climb, which is in Davidson’s category of concrete particulars 
did not exist. The existence of an event, like the existence of an object, cannot be presupposed 
to its coming to exist. 
This will explain why, as I argued, Davidson’s belief that an event exists having the property 
of being a turning of a light could not have been a cause of any actual event having that 
property. 
IV 
I found fault with Davidson’s event causal theory of action. And I’ve questioned the intelligibility 
of the predicates that Davidson introduced in his treatment of action sentences. But I’ve just 
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suggested that there need not be objections to the concrete particulars that Davidson takes 
events to be. I want now to bring the pieces together. 
Davidson had things to say about causation as well as about action, and he spoke of events 
under both heads. But when he was concerned with causation, Davidson didn’t confine himself 
to events in the ontology to which he asserted our commitment. Although he took causation to 
be a relation between particulars, they were not the particulars that can be said to exist by 
virtue of the truth of past tensed sentences. Davidson didn’t seek an account of “c caused e” or 
of “c was a cause of e”. When “cause” is taken to be a relation between events, it is simply not 
in question whether the events said to be related have actually occurred. 
Evidently Davidson had no problem with the language of causation. Why then should he 
have spoken of our ontological commitment as extending only to events that are, as I put it, 
inherently past? Well, there might be a particular reason to speak of the past when the topic is 
human action. In doing so, one may register a commitment to the unalterability of the past; and 
a human agent takes an unalterable past quite for granted. Desiring an end, an agent looks 
forward—forward to a future in which she might come to have made a difference. The role of 
making a difference was not one that Davidson assigned to agents, however. Davidson assigned 
that role to events. In doing so I think that Davidson abjured the perspective of an agent. His 
treatment of the structure of action sentences stands in the way of an account in which the 
perspective of an agent can be accommodated. 
I argued that Davidson fabricated predicates which are not intelligible as they stand. These 
are the predicates got by introducing an extra place into an ordinary verb usable in saying what 
someone did. Of course Davidson had his reasons for fabricating these predicates. He sought a 
treatment of adverbs, which he spelled out in his 1967a. Davidson wanted to explain why it 
should be that, for instance, “I flew my spaceship to the Morning Star” entails “I flew my 
spaceship.” His idea was that if “flew” is given its own extra place, for events, and the “to” of “to 
the Morning Star” is taken to express a relation between an event and an object, then the 
inference from “I flew my spaceship to the Morning Star” to its adverb-free counterpart can be 
a matter of the elimination of a conjunct. With this idea in place, accounting for a range of 
adverb-dropping inferences appears to be plain sailing.11 Notice, however, that “Flew(x,y,e)” 
could only treat “flew” (past tense); so that if a general treatment of adverbs on these lines 
were wanted, it would be necessary to introduce as many new three-place predicates as there 
are different tenses that a verb of action might take. In order to treat sentences containing “will 
fly”, for instance, “Will fly (x ,y ,e)” would have to be introduced. And then there are 
progressives which differ from Davidson’s simple past tenses in being imperfect—“is [was /will 
be] climbing y”, “is [was /will be] flying”, and so on. Although he was concerned to explain 
entailments, Davidson had nothing to say about why “I flew my spaceship” should entail “I was 
flying my spaceship.”12 
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By making use of an ontology of events fitted for the treatment of sentences containing 
only past perfective verbs, Davidson allowed no sense to be given to an idea which can be 
conveyed with progressive uses of verbs—the idea of things in progress. Davidson’s concrete 
events, all being past, participate in the same static character as the abstract events between 
which the relation of “cause” may obtain. That precludes an action verb from being used to 
speak of a dynamic situation. So Davidson managed to exclude the perspective of one who lives 
in time—of one who might be making progress toward some end, or witnessing something in 
the process of doing something. His apparatus of events provides for no way to understand such 
sentences as “He will be looking it up in the O.E.D.”, “She is climbing the mountain”, “He was 
buttering the toast.”  
I said that Davidson had no need to rely on his claims about linguistic structure in order to 
defend his ontology of events as concrete particulars. What we can now see, I think, is that in 
introducing the structure he did into action sentence, Davidson puts paid to the metaphysics in 
which he gave a place to an event ontology. That metaphysics accords to objects a continuing 
identity over time; and it is only by thinking of objects as things that may in some respects be 
different at different times that we can understand the possibility of a change which happens 
over time—time during which an agent may be acting.13 But Davidson extrudes any idea of an 
agent’s acting—of her being in action—by taking causality of any sort to involve a relation 
between events. In treating predications of action verbs as if they always introduced events, the 
only conception of causality Davidson could allow to be in play is encapsulated in a relation that 
obtains between static things. Davidson’s concrete particulars may make room for a kind of 
reality which attaches to the past; but his introduction of event-causation served to expunge 
the reality of the present—the present in which there exist agents and the objects on which or 
with which they may act. 
Many of the verbs which belong in Davidson’s action sentences (or at least belong there if 
they’re put into the past tense) are so-called causatives. Such verbs when predicated of agents 
record their acting. Now inasmuch as “a sank b” might be glossed “a caused b to sink”, one 
might very well think that a was acting on b so long as she was sinking b. Davidson, however, in 
keeping with his insistence that causality is everywhere a relation between events treated “a 
sank b” as recording the existence of a pair (of at least one par) of events, where in any such 
pair of events a participated in one, and b was involved in the other, and the one caused the 
other. I think that this will strike anyone who is not inured to accounts along these lines as far-
fetched. 
I have blamed Davidson’s insistence that causality is everywhere a relation between events 
on his treating action sentences in such a way as to lose sight of the temporality of existing 
objects. But there may be another reason why Davidson and others should have found it easy to 
overlook the idea of causality that goes hand in hand with the idea of agents’ acting. We grasp 
ideas of acting before we use the word “cause”. In setting out to do something, or in knowing 
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what is going on, one has no need to bring to bear a prior, generic understanding of “cause” 
such as is introduced into glosses of causative verbs. As G.E.M. Anscombe said “in learning to 
speak we learned the linguistic representation and application of a host of causal concepts.” 
(1971). But these causal concepts with their causal character may not be in view when a 
philosopher wields the word “cause”.14 
V 
I hope that my exploration of some of Davidson’s philosophy has equipped me with materials to 
consider what conception of causality belongs in a right-thinking philosophical naturalism. 
The project of banishing teleology from the study of nature began in the 17th-century. But 
it was not until a science of psychology came onto the scene that anyone felt any need to purge 
explanations of human behavior of the teleological.15 So I began from Ducasse and his account 
of purposiveness. Ducasse, rightly assuming that “a fact that has not yet occurred could not be a 
cause of a fact that has already occurred” thought that teleology could be compatible with 
mechanism only insofar as beliefs and desires are “capable of descriptions as kinds of neural 
mechanisms” (1925, 154). I suspect that Ducasse thought this because, like Davidson, he failed 
to see that an agent might have acted in such a way as to have brought some fact about. 
Davidson for his part saw no need to assume, as Ducasse had, that human agents believe in 
causal laws. It can be an attractive feature of Davidson’s teleological explanations that they at 
no point invoke laws such as are needed for explanations in the natural sciences. There is a kind 
of anti-reductionism in Davidson which many may find congenial.  
Both Ducasse and Davidson confined their attention to human agency. As far as they were 
concerned, the job of finding a place for the teleological in the causal world extended only to 
the doings of creatures with beliefs and desires. As far as I know, Davidson said nothing about 
the behavior of non-human animals. Ducasse, however, was quite explicit that the 
purposiveness he characterized was absent from the animal world, saying that squirrels could 
have no purpose in burying their nuts because they lack beliefs. But even if purposes cannot be 
attributed to animals, can ends not be?16 Understanding animal behavior seems bound to 
require teleology. Still, it is not teleology as such which is allowed on the scene when one 
accepts the idea of causality which I’ve argued that Davidson excluded—the idea which belongs 
with the idea of acting. Although inanimate objects lack both purposes and ends, there are 
plenty of verbs that can be used in saying what an inanimate object will do/is doing/did, or what 
it will suffer/is suffering/suffered. There is a kind of causality in play in agency of any sort. 
Agential causal concepts are not used only in recording the observations of animate beings. 
But more significant for my present purposes than our use of agential causal concepts in 
knowing what is observably happening is our use of them as the agents that we are. Where 
there is human action, there is an agent who knows how to get things done.17 She may know, 
for instance, that she will achieve a particular result by acting in a certain way. If she deliberates 
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about what to do, then she must know how such objects as she might act upon or with will 
react in order to know how she herself might act. She may have no need to give any thought to 
the question which events cause which other events.  
Now if the concepts that any agent uses when she says what she has done, or is doing, or 
will do, are those causal ones whose linguistic representation she learned in learning to speak, 
then presumably we are all au fait with the species of causality that goes hand in hand with the 
idea of acting. It is plausible that in order to have learnt which events cause which others, we 
have made use of a sort of abstraction, abstraction based in our implementation of the 
concepts we have of how we might act. So if it is allowed that a person’s understanding of 
causation is acquired in the time bound perspective in which they live and act, then it won’t be 
possible to treat event causal notions as the fundamental ones. It won’t be possible to supplant 
the causality of agency with event causation. That, I have argued, is exactly what Davidson did 
when he introduced the causal theory of action. 
 
The last fifty odd years have seen additions and refinements to the causal story as Davidson told 
it in 1963. When he introduced intention, Davidson had an agent who “intended to do with his 
body whatever is needed …”, where the needed movement causes further events in turn, 
culminating in an event whose occurrence suffices for the agent to have done what he intended 
(1971). So a chain of events is required for an action. Still, when any such chain begins—before 
the agent does whatever is needed with his body—none of these events exists. The problem I 
made for Davidson in §II remains. (The “belief that the action described in a certain way has a 
certain property” is now a belief that can be true only insofar as a bodily movement of the agent 
exists.) 
Writers who have followed in Davidson’s footsteps, taking event causation to connect an 
agent’s psychological states with the agent’s doing what she intended, don’t see fit to include 
any of the details of the sequences of events.18 Perhaps they aren’t much interested in the 
metaphysics: they can allude to Davidson’s telling of an event causal story, without themselves 
expounding it, while welcoming the sort of anti-reductionism which Davidson seems to make 
possible.Their assumption then seems to be that in locating agency in the event causal order, 
they have located it in the natural causal order. At least I find it to be a view commonly held 
that naturalism commits one to thinking of human agency as belonging in the event-causal 
world. Well, I think that we must reject an event-causal naturalism if we are to allow continuant 
objects a place in the natural world. We need a naturalism which allows that it is only within 
time that there can be action on the part of anything.  
Even while the last fifty years have seen event causal theorists offer more and more 
conceptually sophisticated philosophies of action, naturalism in some quarters has taken less 
moderate forms. Naturalism may be said to be “the philosophical theory that treats science as 
our most reliable source of knowledge and scientific method as the most effective route to 
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knowledge” (Rosenberg 2011). But could all human activity be the application of scientific 
method? Is there not human activity which requires knowledge, and cannot quite everyday 
human activity yield knowledge? Would the scientific method have availed humanity if the 
knowledge presupposed to its application were less reliable than the knowledge got when the 
method is applied? 
My suggestion is that so far from moving towards naturalism in its more radical versions, a 
considered philosophy of action must lead in a direction opposite to that of the prevailing 
currents.19 Certainly there is no need to postulate anything “unnatural” in order to introduce 
the dynamic character of agency. This is introduced as soon as it is appreciated that time is 
passing when someone is doing something, and will be passing if she will in the future be doing 
anything. If time didn’t pass, nothing would ever have got to have been done. It would obviously 
be perfectly pointless ever to intend to do anything unless one could rely on the passage of 
time. And ‘rely on’ here puts it mildly of course: time is not given to us as that whose passage 
we can put our faith in. We live and think and act in time. 
In some quarters, an unwillingness to commit even to what is taken to be the most 
moderate naturalism is supposed to require a kind of quietism which repudiates all 
metaphysical questions. But I have not repudiated them all. I have not disagreed with what 
Davidson said when he spoke of the metaphysics implicit in our language. I have suggested only 
that he failed to allow for the time-bound perspective of the speakers of any language. He failed 
in this, I have claimed, because in treating action sentences as he did, he obliterated a category 
of predication, and thus treated causation in a manner which obliterated a kind of causality.20 
 
Notes 
1. He read Ducasse 1925 as reprinted in Feigl and Sellars (Davidson, 2001, 260). Both in Feigl and Sellars 
(Readings in Philosophical Analysis) and as it is referred to by Davidson, the article is mistakenly cited as 
in The Journal of Philosophy 1926, where there is another article by Ducasse. 
2. In (C1) Davidson defined what he called “a primary reason”—a notion of which he made no use after 
(1963). It is easily seen why the notion should have dropped out of account. Take Davidson’s light-
switching-on example. One would give different explanations—cite different reasons—according as one 
was asked why Davidson flipped the switch, why he moved his finger, why he illuminated the room. 
Different reasons, each of them, turn out then to be “primary”. 
3. This is a feature of Davidson’s writings on action to which Michael Thompson drew attention (e.g. 
Thompson 2008, 136n17.) Thompson has considerably more to say in positive vein about time and action 
than I can even start on here. Perhaps I should make it clear that it is not my aim in this lecture to make 




                                                                                                                                                                            
4. The “amygdala” example is in “The Objectivity of Values”, Essay 3 of Davidson 2004. The other examples I 
allude to are in other Essays in that volume. 
5. Davidson explained the idea of semantic compositionality when he said “The work of a theory [of 
meaning] is in relating the known truth-conditions of each sentence to those aspects of the sentence that 
recur in other sentences, and can be assigned identical roles in other sentences.” 1967b, 311. As 
Davidson conceived a theory of meaning for a language, its inputs must have a syntax revealed in the 
logical form of the sentences of the language. 
6. Davidson’s idea that verbal predications introduce existential quantification over underlying events has 
inspired a research program in linguistics. The events quantified over in that program are not the 
concrete particulars to which Davidson said we are committed; and the doubts I express here about 
Davidson’s treatment of events are bound to rebound on that programme. Myself, I think that the 
programme’s aims must be redefined when it’s allowed that one cannot step outside of time in order to 
record what’s said in speakers’ time-bound perspective. Obviously I cannot argue this here. 
7. My point about there being an implicit time reference in ordinary use would explain why Davidson 
should originally have thought that an action sentence contains a singular reference to an event.  
  There is no need, however, to disagree with the point which Davidson later appreciated—sc. that it 
doesn’t count against the literal truth of “a φ-d” that a should have φ-d more than once. “a’s φ-ing” may 
have more than one denotation (in the category of events). Still I think that someone who wanted to 
convey that a had φ-d more than once would ordinarily find a different way of saying so than by using 
simply “a φ-d”. 
8. A question about the persistence of objects is sometimes put by asking: “Is O1 which exists at time t1 the 
same object as O2 which exists at t2?”. The perdurantist (anti-endurantist) answers “No: O1 and O2 are 
parts of a temporally perduring thing.” But if O1 and O2 exist by virtue of O’s having remained the same 
(through change as it might be), then the question cannot be understood as the perdurantist takes it—as 
if there could be a question about O’s atemporal existence.  
9. We wouldn’t ordinarily describe Meyer’s climbing of Kibo as a change. But I take it that when Davidson 
spoke of “a change in an object or objects”, he would have allowed it to suffice for a change’s having 
occurred that something had acquired or lost a property. On a more usual understanding of a change, a 
change take place in an object on which an agent acts. This more usual understanding belongs with a 
conception of causality which is different from Davidson’s, a conception which in §V I shall suggest is 
fundamental.  
10. Thus particulars in neither category are simply future. Of course in both cases, it may be that in the 




                                                                                                                                                                            
her first child “Sam”, then in the future there will exist a child of Mary’s called Sam. If you haven’t yet, 
eaten dinner today, then, so long as you will eat dinner today, in the future there will exist an event of 
your eating of dinner on today’s date.  
  In the case of objects, one can distinguish between their being present and their remaining in 
existence (i.e. continuing to be possible objects of reference). Objects are present only so long as they 
endure; when they have perished, they remain in existence but no longer change. 
11. Taking it to be obvious that an account of adverbial modification is inadequate if it has application only to 
sentences in the simple past tense, I note that Davidson’s account may strike us as implausible even 
when restricted to such sentences. As Helen Steward has said “It is most unnatural to think of most of 
the adjectives which can be obtained by grammatical modification (in English, usually deletion of the 
terminating ‘ly’) from qualifying adverbs of manner as adjectives which are straightforwardly applicable 
to events.” Steward asks: “Are there really events which are angry or naughty or careful?” (Steward 
2012, 375). Perhaps I should say that although I agree with Steward that the answer is a clear No, I don’t 
myself agree with Steward’s way out, which is to think of actions as individual processes. 
12. Nor of course did he have anything to say about why it should be that “I was flying my spaceship to the 
Morning Star” does not entail “I flew my spaceship to the Morning Star.” Failures of entailment such as 
this count against thinking that an understanding of “a was/will be φ-ing” might be simply derived from 
“a φ-d/will have φ-d.” Myself I think that they put in question the very idea of an “individual process”. 
13. I say “may be acting.” I assume however that so long as someone is awake, there is something that might 
be said about what she is doing even if her body is at rest. One effect of treating actions as events, each 
of them as if it were an isolable thing, is that it gives the impression that someone’s doing something 
always started from a state of abeyance she was in. 
14. I write here as if any idea of causality could be subsumed under one of exactly two heads—one event 
causal, the other pertaining to agency. The truth is much more complicated than this allows. See e.g. 
Cartwright 2004.  
15. For an instructive review of the history of the attempt to cast teleology out of science, see Milgram et al 
2013. 
16. I was taught as a child that squirrels bury their nuts in order that they should have food in the winter. I’ve 
since learnt that there’s a complicated story to be told about the habits of squirrels. But even when 
ethologists try to make of sense of squirrels’ burying and re-burying the same nuts, and of squirrels’ 
faking false caches of nuts, the assumption stays in place that squirrels sometimes avoid starvation by 
unearthing nuts that they had earlier buried. The questions that arise concern what other ends a squirrel 




                                                                                                                                                                            
17. And an agent who can say what she is doing.This is all but forgotten when the explanation of action is 
made the issue; for explanation proceeds from the standpoint of one who would know why the agent 
has done something, not from the standpoint of the agent herself.For more on this, and the consequent 
distortions to which philosophy of action has been prone, see Ford 2017. 
18. Michael Smith, being perhaps the most resolute defender of an event causal theory in Davidson’s style, 
may be an exception to this generalization. Evidently, I shall want to criticize any spelled out version of an 
event causal theory. In the case of Smith, I might start by pointing out that the desire he attributes to 
agents, which, along with a belief, causes an action of theirs, is a desire “that things be a certain way” 
(Smith 2012, 387). Well, if things are a certain way, I may be happy about that but I won’t need to do 
anything about it. It is only when I desire things to come to be a certain way (a way I take them not 
already to be) that my having a desire will explain my doing something about it. (The “be” of Smith’s 
“things be” may be subjunctive, but it cannot be a simple present indicative.) So I find Smith’s story 
objectionable in part because, like Davidson, he fails to keep proper track of tense. Failure to keep track 
of tense is something that I think Smith has in common with all of those I’d label event causal theorists, 
and which I’d attribute to fast and loose use of the notion of a proposition. 
19. I think here of metaphysics as conceived by those who take the important enquiries to be 
metametaphysical. And I think of Ross et al. 2013, a chapter of which is called “A Defense of Scientism.” I 
had thought that “scientistic” was used pejoratively, and hadn’t known it could be a badge of honour.  
  I allow that there can be hosts of metaphysical questions beyond any that I’ve begun to broach. 
Science, in any of its various branches, can throw up questions in metaphysics. But should we really think 
that science’s questions can displace those that pre-scientifically we think to ask? 
20.  I have been helped by conversations, about matters relating to verb tense and aspect, with Will Small, 
Robert Craven and Jan Zhou. I’m aware that they won’t all of them think that I’ve learned anything from 
them. 
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